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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SERVITUDE WITHOUT SOLVENCY: THE DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO
CONTINUE RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS DURING A
CHAPTER 13 REHABILITATION PLAN
Few courts have decided by published opinion whether a debtor can
continue to make religious contributions, commonly called tithes,1 dur-
ing bankruptcy.2 Most of these courts have held that a bankrupt cannot
continue tithing at the expense of his creditors. The court decisions ra-
tionalize that a debtor under reorganization should not be allowed to
continue making religious contributions until he pays his creditors in
full.3 A recent case, however, not only allows tithing during a reorgani-
zation plan, but holds that tithing must be allowed to avoid interference
with the free exercise clause.4
This Recent Development consists of five sections: Section I briefly
discusses the free exercise and establishment clauses;5 Section II de-
scribes the bankruptcy reorganization process;6 Section III summarizes
the reported cases disallowing tithing during reorganization; Section IV
briefs the recent case allowing tithing during reorganization;7 and Sec-
tion V critiques this recent development.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
The first amendment of the Constitution guarantees several rights.8
1. A "tithe" is "[a] tenth part of one's income, contributed for charitable or religious pur-
poses." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1330 (5th ed. 1979).
2. The case law is even more paltry when one looks at each chapter of bankruptcy individu-
ally. Only two such reported cases in Chapter 7 bankruptcy exist, and only five Chapter 13 cases on
tithing have been published.
3. It is nearly unheard of for an unsecured creditor to receive any amount close to one hun-
dred percent of the debt owed her. The average amount that debtors actually pay in Chapter 13
cases is 57% (not discounted to present value). U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978-A Before and After Look 45 (1983).
4. In re Green, 73 Bankr. 893 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
5. The free exercise and establishment clauses derive form the first clause of the first
amendment.
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1986).
7. See supra note 4.
8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
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The first clause of that amendment contains the religion clauses.' The
free exercise clause refers to that portion of the first clause guaranteeing
citizens the freedom to choose their own religion. The establishment
clause prohibits the government from creating a religion.'0
The free exercise and establishment clauses have wider application
than their express language indicates. The modern construction of the
first amendment prohibits the government from interfering with a per-
son's religious practices unless a substantial state interest exists.II Courts
construe the establishment clause to require the government to refrain
from substantially advancing any religion. 2
A government regulation must pass a three-prong test to avoid violat-
ing the free exercise and establishment clauses.1 First, the regulation
must have a secular legislative purpose. 4 Second, the principal effect of
the regulation must neither advance nor inhibit religion. Third, the regu-
lation must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.'"
II. THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS
Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 6 offers debtors the opportu-
nity to construct a workable plan for 'the payment of their debts without
losing their property. 7 In brief, a debtor files for relief with the bank-
ruptcy court and then submits a plan that describes how she will pay the
debt. 8 The plan lists the debtor's income, expenses, and the surplus
available to apply against the debt she owes. If the debtor makes the
scheduled payments, most remaining debts disappear, or are "dis-
charged," at the expiration of the plan. 9
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; . . ." Id.
10. Green, 73 Bankr. at 893.
11. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065
(10th Cir. 1985).
12. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
13. Id.
14. A secular legislative purpose generally means the regulation must have a legitimate purpose
other than advancing religion. Id.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 6.
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321-28 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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A plan must meet numerous requirements in order for the court to
confirm it.20 Creditors must receive as much under the plan as they
would have had the court liquidated the debtor's property and used the
sale proceeds to pay off her debts.21 Additionally, if a creditor objects to
the plan,22 the plan must provide either: (1) that the creditor will not
receive his entire debt,23 or, (2) that while the plan is in effect, all the
debtor's "dischargeable income" will be used to pay debts.24 The Code
defines "dischargeable income" as all income received by the debtor not
"reasonably necessary" for the support of this debtor and her
dependents.25
The debtor must also propose the plan in good faith. 26 The Code does
not specifically address the details of this requirement. Courts generally
look to the plan as a whole and judge whether the debtor has proposed it
in good faith in accordance with equitable principles.27
III. COURTS DENYING CONFIRMATION OF TITHING PLAN
Courts that have denied the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans that in-
clude tithing have made that decision under two theories. Some courts
have found a plan providing for tithing fails the "good faith" test,28 while
other courts base their holdings on the plan's failure to meet the "dispos-
able income" test.29
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. Most commentators call this the "best interests test." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982).
22. Actually, only a creditor with an unsecured claim can object to confirmation. Because of
the Code's terminology, however, undersecured creditors also have unsecured claims, and can there-
fore object to confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). The trustee in the case can also object to
confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1985). The creditor, in fact, is only guaranteed the
entire amount of his claim. Although the claim usually equals the debt, certain circumstances may
disallow part of the debt, thus reducing the bankruptcy claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. I 1982).
24. This is commonly referred to as the "disposable income test." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B)
(Supp. III 1985).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985). Disposable income does not include amounts
used for the "continuation, preservation and operation" of a business. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(B)
(Supp. III 1986).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982).
27. See In re Breckenridge, 12 Bankr. 159, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Cook, 3 Bankr. 480
(S.D. W. Va. 1980).
28. See supra note 26.
29. See supra notes 24-25.
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A. Good Faith Test
Whether a debtor proposed a plan in good faith cannot be determined
by a static test. Courts usually judge "compliance with the requirement
based upon the overall picture presented by the debtors' Chapter 13
statement and plan."' 30 Courts have used several arguments in finding
that a plan fails the good faith requirement.
The court in In re Breckenridge denied confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan donating nearly one-half of the debtor's disposable income31 to his
church.32 Because the plan allowed the debtor to retain "imprudently
purchased assets" and provided for a tithe of almost one-half of the
debtor's net income, the court found a lack of good faith and denied
confirmation.33
In re Curry34 presents a unique case in which the court combined the
two prevalent arguments and found a plan failed the good faith test be-
cause it failed the "disposable income" test. 35 After noting that the plan
tithed half of the debtor's disposable income to his church, the court
stated, "[g]ood faith requires, at least, that the debtor is willing to pay to
the trusts for the benefit of his creditors all of his disposable income after
provision for his necessary and reasonable living expenses.... A charita-
ble contribution ... does not constitute a reasonably necessary living
expense."
3 6
B. The Disposable Income Test
Courts also deny confirmation to Chapter 13 plans that include tithing
because they fail to pass the disposable income test. The Code requires
30. Breckenridge, 12 Bankr. at 160.
31. The plan provided for payment of only 10% of the amount owed unsecured creditors. Id.
at 159. Without the tithe, the plan would have provided unsecured creditors more than 70% of their
claims (these figures do not represent payments discounted to present value).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 160.
34. In re Curry, No. 87-02256 slip op. (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 1987).
35. See supra notes 24-26. Although the good faith and disposable income standards remain
separate tests, the Curry court seemed to hold that the good faith test requires, at a minimum,
compliance with the disposable income test. Curry, No. 87-02256, slip op. (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug.
20, 1987).
36. Id. See also In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101, 107 (D. Conn. 1981) ("the appropriate amount to be
set aside for the debtor ought to be sufficient to sustain basic needs, not related to his former status in
society or the lifestyle to which he is accustomed."); In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
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the debtor to pay all disposable income to his creditors.37 Disposable
income equals a debtor's gross income less reasonably necessary living
expenses for the debtor and the debtor's dependents.38
The debtor in In re Sturgeon 39 scheduled ten percent of her gross in-
come as a tithe in her chapter plan.' The court found, as a matter of
law, the tithe was not a necessary living expense.41 The plan did not
distribute all disposable income to creditors, and thus precluded court
confirmation.42
IV. CONFIRMATION OF A TITHING PLAN
Only one reported case, In re Green,43 has allowed a Chapter 13 debtor
to tithe during the life of the plan.4 In Green, the debtor devoted ten
percent of her gross income each month to her church in accordance
with the church's doctrine.45 An unsecured creditor46 objected to confir-
mation of the debtor's plan.
The objecting creditor argued that confirmation of a plan including
tithing advanced religion and therefore violated the establishment
clause.47 The creditor claimed confirming a tithing plan would favor reli-
gions that required tithing over those that did not, and favor debtors who
tithed over those who did not.48
Before considering the constitutional issue, the Green court considered
other cases addressing the tithing question. Because the creditor did not
object to the "reasonableness" of the debtor's plan, the Green court did
37. See supra notes 24-25.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
39. In re Sturgeon, 51 Bankr. 82 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
40. Id. at 83. The tithe was one hundred and forty dollars per month.
41. Id. at 84.
42, After an objection to confirmation by a creditor or trustee, a court cannot confirm a plan
that does not meet the disposable income test. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
44. At least two cases, however, have allowed tithing in Chapter 7 proceedings. In re Gaukler,
63 Bankr. 224 (D.N.D. 1986); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
45. The amount of the tithe was S140 per month. Without the tithe, the plan would have paid
the unsecured creditors 50% of their claims. After payment of the tithe, however, those same credi-
tors received only 17% of the amount the debtor owed to them (These figures do not represent
payments discounted to present value).
46. The unsecured creditor in this case, the State of North Dakota, sought to recover on the
debtor's defaulted student loans.
47. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
48. Green, 73 Bankr. at 893.
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not find the cases disallowing tithing, such as Sturgeon49 and Brecken-
ridge,50 relevant.51
The court then applied the Lemon v. Kurtzman three-prong test5 2 to
determine if a tithing plan violated the establishment clause.5 3 The court
found that the relief of debtors from burdensome debts was the Bank-
ruptcy Code's secular legislative purpose, thereby satisfying the first
prong. Second, the Green court noted the government did not advance
religion by allowing tithing under the Code because the tithe came from
the debtor, and not the government. Finally, the court decided that be-
cause the government did not become involved in the tithe, the last prong
of the test was satisfied; there was no excessive entanglement.5 4 Because
the tithing plan satisfied the three-prong test, the court did not violate the
establishment clause by confirming the plan."
Conversely, the Green court held that a denial of confirmation of the
plan solely because of the tithe would violate the free exercise clause.
5 6
The court based its rationale on an unemployment case.5 7 In that case, a
convert to a religion that did not allow work on Fridays and Saturdays
informed her employer she would no longer work on those days. The
employer fired the convert, and she applied for unemployment compen-
sation. The compensation board denied the benefits, deciding refusal to
work constituted misconduct. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Board's decision, and held that forcing a person to make an
election between her religion and a government benefit put too great a
burden on the freedom of religion. 8 The Green court stated that by
49. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 27.
51. Judge Howard, writing for the court, criticized courts that disallowed tithing in Chapter 13.
Since the State is not challenging the reasonableness of the confirmed plan, the Court does
not believe that the case of In re Sturgeon, [citation omitted], is relevant. The Sturgeon
opinion does not address the constitutional questions involved.... Sturgeon presents the
unfortunate situation of a judge evaluating the religious beliefs and practices of debtors
without seeking any guidance from the large body of first amendment case law. This criti-
cism applies equally well to two other cases which have considered the question of tithing,
and for that reason the court rejects them also. (citing Breckenridge and In re Cadogan, 4
Bankr. 598 (W.D. La. 1980) (dismissed on other grounds)).
Green, 73 Bankr. at 894 n.1.
52. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
54. Green, 73 Bankr. at 895.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 107 S.Ct. 1046 (1987).
58. Id. at 1049.
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analogy forcing a debtor to choose between bankruptcy relief and tithing
placed a similar burden on the free exercise clause that only a "compel-
ling state interest" could justify. There was no compelling state interest
here.59
V. CRITIQUE OF IN RE GREEN
The Green court erred both by finding it constitutionally necessary to
allow tithing in a Chapter 13 plan, and by improperly applying the "dis-
posable income" test.
A. The Constitutional Question
In Green, the court held that to disallow tithing under a reorganization
plan violates the free exercise clause because it conditioned an important
government benefit, bankruptcy relief, on the debtor abandoning her reli-
gious beliefs.' ° The Green opinion, however, acknowledged that tithing
could be disallowed if a compelling governmental interest existed.
Such a compelling government interest does exist in a Chapter 13 reor-
ganization. "[T]he purpose of Chapter 13 is to provide the maximum
recovery to creditors while at the same time leaving the debtor sufficient
money to pay his or her basic living expenses."61 The government's com-
pelling interest is to achieve the purpose of Chapter 13. Maximizing the
creditor's recovery by disallowing tithing is essential to achieve that
purpose.62
Even if no compelling government interest did exist, courts could still
disallow tithing in Chapter 13 plans without offending the free exercise
clause. The Green decision rested on the theory that a debtor would not
have adequate bankruptcy relief unless she abandoned her religious belief
of tithing.63 A debtor, however, has forms of bankruptcy relief other
than Chapter 13 available to her.
A debtor wishing to tithe can seek bankruptcy relief under Chapter
7.64 In Chapter 7, the court liquidates most of the debtor's property and
59. Green, 73 Bankr. at 896.
60. Id.
61. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 466 (D. Minn. 1985).
62. If the court disallows tithing, any amount allocated in the plan for tithing then becomes
available for distribution to the creditors. See Green, 73 Bankr. at 893-94.
63. See supra note 59.
64. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. III 1985).
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applies the proceeds toward satisfaction of her debts.65 Subsequent to
liquidation, the court forgives, or "discharges," any remaining debts.66
Since Chapter 7 does not use the disposable income test,67 a debtor can
continue to tithe while receiving Chapter 7's benefits. Because the Code
does not deny bankruptcy relief to a debtor wishing to tithe, disallowing
tithing in a Chapter 13 plan does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
B. The Disposable Income Test
The Green court erred in failing to apply the disposable income test.68
Because no creditors objected to the tithe in the debtor's plan, the court
decided the "reasonableness" of the plan was not at issue.6 9
The Bankruptcy Code does not require creditors to object to any par-
ticular item within a plan. If, however, a creditor70 does object to the
confirmation of the plan,71 the court must apply the disposable income
test.
72
"Disposable income" equals all income received by the debtor less the
amount "reasonably necessary ... for the maintenance or support of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor. ' 73 A tithe does not contribute to
65. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 726 (Supp. III 1985).
66. Certain debts, usually those involving fraud or unfair dealing, can be denied discharge by
the court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
67. See supra notes 24-25. Generally, the court will grant Chapter 7 relief unless there is "sub-
stantial abuse" of the process. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1986). Substantial abuse usually occurs with
high-income, low asset debtors, who want to discharge debts while sacrificing very little property
and without additional payment of their debts. See also Corish & Herbert, The Debtor's Dilemma:
Disposable Income as the Cost of Chapter 13 Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, LA. L. REv. 47
(1986); supra note 44.
68. See supra notes 24-25.
69. Green, 73 Bankr. at 894.
70. Not every creditor can object to confirmation. See supra note 22.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp III 1985).
72. The court can not refuse to apply the test. See supra note 42. The Green court discusses the
reasonableness of the proposed plan several times. 73 Bankr. at 893, 894 n.l. Chapter 13 does not
require a plan to be reasonable. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1986).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985). It is well settled that the disposable income test
prohibits charitable contributions. See, e.g., In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (disallow-
ing $1.50 per week charitable contribution). "The courts have universally ruled that, if charity be-
gins at home, it ends with bankruptcy." Corish & Herbert, 47 LA. L. REV. at 74. Tithing is, in
effect, a charitable donation and should similarly be disallowed.
When a debtor tithes, it does not cost him anything because without the tithe, the plan would
distribute the money to the bankrupt's creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Thus, in
effect, the creditors involuntarily tithe to the debtor's church if a Chapter 13 plan allows tithing. See
Corish & Herbert, 47 LA. L. REv. at 72. The Author believes that Congress could not possibly have
contemplated such an inequitable result.
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the maintenance or support of the debtor or her dependents.
The court cannot exercise discretion in applying the disposable income
test. If a creditor objects, "the court may not approve the plan unless the
test is met."74 The Green court, therefore, erred by choosing not to apply
the disposable income test to the debtor's plan after the creditor's objec-
tion to confirmation. If the court had properly applied the test, the tith-
ing provision would have prevented confirmation of the plan.
VI. CONCLUSION
A debtor generally cannot continue religious tithing during a Chapter
13 plan. Nevertheless, the Green case decided that to deny confirmation
of a plan permitting tithing violates the free exercise clause. Denying
confirmation, however, does not create a free exercise violation because a
compelling state interest justifies interfering with religious freedom, and a
tithing debtor can obtain other forms of bankruptcy relief.
Furthermore, the Green court exercised its discretion in not applying
the Chapter 13 disposable income test to the debtor's plan. The Code
does not give courts discretion in applying this test. If the court had
properly applied the test, the debtor's plan could not have been
confirmed.
Nicholas A. Franke
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added in text). See also supra note 2.
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